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ABSTRACT

Taking into consideration of the unique features and practice of casino gaming,

the significance of law in the development of this industry, and the onging interactions between
law, the industry’s succeeding performance and its spillover effects are generalized and
illustrated in this paper. Based on the rationales of law and economics, and the institutional
approach to economic analysis, a functional model is constructed to depict the related
interplaying forces and the development of casino gaming. In principle, it is shown that business
scope and scale of casino gaming is largely defined by law on one hand, and the revisions of
related regulations are interactively influenced by the industry’s performance and its spillover
effects on the other hand. By compiling some related evidences from the major Asian casino
jurisdictions (Macao, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea), it is revealed that the practice of casino
gaming is indeed a combined dynamics of law and its spillover effects.

1. Introduction and Approach
Despite the predominance of free market as advocated by most economists, contentions
on the role of a government in regulating and controlling the practice of various economic
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activities remain to be explored. Throughout the world history of economic progress, it is
apparent that Smith’s invisible hand never works liberally.

As quoted by Pigou in The

Economics of Welfare (1920, 112), “the working of self-interest is generally beneficent, not
because of some natural coincidence between the self-interest of each and the good of all, but
because human institutions are arranged so as to compel self-interest to work in directions in
which it will be beneficent.” (Cannan, 1913, 333) To economists who explore how do, instead
of how should, markets works, it is assented that “economic freedom alone is not sufficient to
guarantee the desired outcome” (Persky, 1989, 201).
Following the increasing involvement of government in the market activities since WWII,
the extent to the studies of law and economics also advanced. From the theses of Weber (1954),
Hayke (1960) and Coase (1960) to the neoclassical economists in law and economics, and
further to the new institutional economists (e.g., North, 1981 and 1990), the significance of law
(which formally frames the practice of a legal system) to the development of markets has gained
its chapter in economics.
Indeed, the degree (including the scope and depth) of government interventions which
interfere the practice of markets are pushed dynamically by the interactions between social and
political interests, as well as the attributes of a particular industry. When intervening into the
markets, the government’s legitimate power is authorized by law, which also confers its
monopoly position in formulating and revising the legal ground for the practice of the markets
within any given period, and their evolution over time.
Analyzing in a dynamic context, feedbacks from the markets also shed lights on the
changes of the related laws over time, which interactively outline the development path and
performance of the markets. To examine the related subject matters, recent development of
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casino gaming as a global industry provides valuable evidences to reveal the interplay between
law, development of a market and its spillover effects with other sectors in the local economy.

1.1 Law in the concerns of harmful effects and social costs
One of the major areas under the exploration of government intervention through its
legislative power is the concerns of harmful effects and social costs which may be generated by
either the production or consumption activities, or the interactions of both. As instigated by
Coase in The problem of social costs (1960), the “pricing system” which relies on contracts to
require the “harmful effects” suppliers to compensate other parties who are being “harmed”
could be so costly to be administered when “many diverse activities are brought within the
control of a single organization” (Coase, 1960, 17). In other words, as the extension of a market
and/or the number of involved parties are getting large, the administrative costs to deal with the
social cost problem could be too high to be resolved by contracts which are, in principle, freely
engaged by the related parties.

Alternatively, a possible “solution is direct government

regulations” by laws (ibid). Indeed, this argument could be well justified by extensive volume of
evidences derived from the progress of the world economies (e.g., related laws and regulations
imposed to control industrial pollution, smoking, public works, as well as production and
consumption of certain goods like alcohol, drugs, rare products, etc.).
Among those economic activities which are practicing under close control of government
regulations, the business of gambling, especially modern development of casino gaming, is
probably one of the most eye-catching subject in exploring the study of the economics of welfare
and law (though it is conventionally not interested by orthodox economists). With reference to
the nature of casino gaming (as a socially and ethically controversial industry), this paper shows
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that as different from the traditional economic sectors, free market approach or a refraining
regulatory model may not be effective to its practice. This indeed provides an interesting realworld case to explore an alternative to the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960). The attributes of
casino gaming show that sufficient (instead of refraining) governmental regulations are a
necessary solution to reduce potential “social harm”, and ensure the market’s positive spillover
effects to the interactive development of certain related industries (as well as the economy as a
whole).
In addition, by applying the underlying arguments of the new institutional economics
(NIE) where states “individuals act on incomplete information and with subjectively derived
models that are frequently erroneous; …… Institutions are not necessarily or even usually
created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the
interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules” (North, 1999, 16), this paper
uncovers how the various erroneous institutions (which lead to non-zero transaction cost in the
market) effectively interplay with the market participants, hence contributing to the different
development paths, performances and interdependencies with other local economic sectors, as
well as business routines across different casino markets. As a matter of fact, these variations
could be largely explained by the differences between their respective regulatory systems
(including the legal foundations at the outset and law enforcement mechanisms in practice).

1.2 An evolutionary approach to law and the development of casino gaming
As recapped by Mercuro and Medema (2006), major approaches followed by economists
in studying “law and economics” include “the Chicago approach to law and economics, public
choice theory, institutional law and economics, and the new institutional economics” (Mercuro
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and Medema, 2006, 1). In principle, while the Chicago approach and the public choice theory
are largely constructed from the neoclassical economic framework, which is deeply influenced
by Newtonianism, the institutionalist approach stresses on the dynamics of a set of humandefined (instead of naturally presented) variables on the progress of an economic society, which
is profoundly enlightened by Darwinism under a form of evolutionary analysis (Hamilton, 2004,
18-28).
On account of the explicit social concerns over the potential harmful effects of a
community’s gambling behavior, hence the related social costs, the scale and development of
casino gaming have long been interplaying with the legal institutions of a society and their
changes over time. Owing to the normative nature of social and political inclinations in the
debate of the degree in which casino gaming is to be regulated by law, institutional economics
provides an appealing ground to construct the analysis. Considering the unique attributes of
casino gaming and the infancy of related studies, reasoning from institutional economics (e.g.,
see Hodgson, 1998; North, 1997) instead of any particular neoclassical economic models would
be followed to explore the subject matters in this paper.
Based on the aforementioned reasoning and the practice of casino gaming, a paradigm (a
functional model) is formulated in section 2 to reveal the interplay between law, the development
and practice of casino gaming, and its spillover effects with other local economic sectors. In
section 3, the method to address the subject matters (i.e., law, casino gaming and the spillover
effects) in this study is presented. Based on the paradigm and the proposed method of study,
selected evidences from the Asian casino markets (e.g., Macao, Singapore, etc.) are presented in
section 4 to verify the related arguments
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2.

A Paradigm of Law and Casino Gaming
Given the tradition that casino gaming is a socially concerned business, its legitimacy,

practice and development path as a modern economic sector in a jurisdiction is largely
encapsulated by its legal framework (this argument may not necessarily be applicable to the less
developed and irregular markets). As expressed in function (1), legitimacy of casino gaming
(CG) is formally restricted by law (  ). Indeed, if a set of social and economic factors/forces (τ )
considered by the public sector and the local community may not generate a sufficient force to
lead to a majority decision of approving the startup of this business (i.e., τ <  ), casino gaming
could not be introduced (i.e., CG = 0) although demand may presents in the market. As stated in
function (2), τ is in principle influenced by such factors/forces as taxation (T), direct and indirect
benefit to the economic society (B) on the upside, as well as direct and indirect “harmful effects”
(including social costs) to the economic society (H) on the downside, and other relevant factors
(u), which are to be evaluated by the policy makers and the community. Owing to the nature of
the these factors, it is reasonable to express that
CG  0

CG  f1 ( , , L, c,  )

if   

if   




 0,
 0,
 0.
T
B
H
(1)

CG = scale of casino gaming (measured by the industry’s GGR, or the share of
the industry’s output in an economy’s GDP, etc.)
 = law which determines the legitimacy or guides the practice of casino gaming
 = a qualitative valuable which is determined by function (2)
 = scale of capital investment (both directly for gaming operations and nongaming facilities being integrated into the casino properties)
 = scale of gaming devices (number of gaming tables and gaming machines)
L = labor input
c = aggregate cost of business (including any voluntary and required share of the
industry’s potential “harmful effects”)
 = market size (volume and type of patrons who could be reached/served by the
industry)
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  f 2 (T , B, H , u )

(2)

When the potential force to support the legitimacy of casino gaming is larger than the
opposing force (i.e., τ   ), CG would then be positive. As depicted in the second condition of
function (1), observed performance (e.g., in terms of the physical scale of casino business, or its
gross gaming revenue, GGR) is determined by a set of business factors (  , , L, c,  ),
where

CG
CG
CG
CG
 0,
 0,
 0,
0.
K

c
M

As a matter of fact, the practice of casino gaming after its legalization may not simply
directed by the market interests, but guided by related laws, as well as influenced by some
physical factors in the market. That is,

(  ,  , L, c ,  )  f 3 (  ,  )

(3)

 = influences from all other non-law factors (e.g., production factors and factor
costs, attributes of demand, etc.)
Analyzing from a dynamic and systematic context, operations of functions (1), (2), and (3)
will provide the spillover effects through CG to T, B, and H, as stated in function (4), to alter the
existing legal framework, hence development path of casino industry.

(T , B, H )  f 4 (CG )

(4)
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In sum, functions (1) and (3) as expressed above identify the interplay between law and
development of casino gaming, as well as the possible influences to to the scale, efficiency, and
progress of the industry. Function (4) summarizes the spillover effects, through the direct and
indirect expansion of casino gaming to the economic society (i.e., function (4) enters into the
operation of function (2) on a dynamic context). Figure 1 depicts the flow of the related forces
in this paradigm.

Figure 1: The interplay between law, development and spillover effect of casino gaming:
Interrelationship between functions (1), (2), (3) and (4)
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3.

Method of study
To reveal the interplay between laws, development and spillover effects of casino gaming

with the above paradigm, their influences on one another and the related feedback effects from
one another could be assessed by reviewing and examining related evidences in discrete and
descriptive forms (both qualitative and quantitative facts). This approach of study is not only
pragmatic vis-à-vis the nature and practice of casino gaming, but also provides a simple and
sufficient ground to compare the differences in the structure and performance of casino gaming
across various jurisdictions in the world markets (especially those in the emerging markets where
related quantitative evidences are not available).
First, in terms of the scale and structure of the industry, their development paths are
commonly shaped/determined by law in the first place, which are traceable from related legal
documents. Unlike other socially less (or not at all) debatable industries like manufacturing,
retail, banking and finance, etc., legitimacy, industrial structure and organization, and expansion
of the scale of casino gaming are sensitively and largely influenced by laws. Accordingly,
discrete legal choices on the related rights and their revisions over time may explain the
development path and changing performance of a casino jurisdiction. This approach of analysis
is indeed in line with the general argument of Schmid (1987, 5) that rights “resolves the question
of who gets what”, and affect “economic performance and outcomes”.
Second, throughout the process of casino development, its spillovers to the economic
society could be revealed by a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators. To the positive
spillovers to the private sector (i.e., B), it is mainly spread from the fixed capital investment and
re-investment (i.e., Κ) made by the casino sector, and the employment opportunities (i.e., L)
generated to the local workforce. Noticeably, business opportunities which are mushroomed to
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the various related local business sectors (e.g., hospitality, tourism, MICE, retail, etc.), the
multiplier effects following the increasing income generated from the casino industry, as well as
possible stimulation to the local property price and asset value may reasonably (though not
necessarily precisely) be identified. Besides, it is commonly consented that increasing tax
income by the public sector (i.e., T) may be beneficial to the local community through the
government’s ability to spend on various social welfare, training and education programs without
the need to levy on the local community.
Third, to the negative spillovers in terms of social cost, related discussions/researches
remain controversial in economics, and between economists and non-economists (see for e.g.,
Walker and Barnett, 1999; Walker, 2003).

Indeed, the forces which may counter to the

development of casino gaming is largely influenced by the post hoc views and assessments of the
community and/or political parties from the observed and suspected harmful effects (which may
not necessarily be identical to social costs in economics). For example, the social preferences to
against casino gaming is commonly based on the concerns of problem and pathological gambling,
and the associated harmful effects (e.g., crime, drugs, family abuse, etc.). Besides, negative
impacts on social ethics and personal belief may always be included as the harmful effects from
the practice of casino gaming. Nevertheless, causation and quantification of these harmful
effects in terms of the aggregate monetary costs for related remedial (or preventive) social
programs may not necessarily be “equal” to social costs in economics.1
In other words, owing to the nature of casino gaming, its potential harmful effects (i.e., H)
may not be totally equivalent to social costs in economics, and those non-economic
considerations in a society do exert real impacts on the development path of this industry.
1

Owing to the objective of this study, the controversies of social cost of casino gaming will not be examined.
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Consequently, H needed to be measured by both monetary and non-monetary terms. While the
latter are qualitative, they may indeed be more significant than the former in the process of
interplaying between law and development of casino gaming. In principle, while that part of
quantifiable harmful effects (or social costs) could be applied directly to offset the positive
spillover effects (i.e., B and T), the non-monetary harmful effects could be categorized as the
“noises” (N), which curb the development of casino gaming in the social and political contexts.
As aforementioned, related hard evidences derived from six Asian casino gaming markets
are analyzed and presented in the next section, to reveal the differences between their scale,
industrial structure and organization. With reference to the related laws which outline the rules
of the game for all parties interacting in the markets, and the spillover effects which may alter
those rules on a dynamic context, differences in the performance and development paths as
observed across various casino jurisdictions will be disclosed.

4. Evidences from Some Asian Casino Gaming Markets
Based on the above arguments as formulated for the interplay between law, development
and spillover effects of casino gaming, this section examines their soundness with evidences
derived from four Asian casino jurisdictions. They are: Macao, Singapore, South Korea, and
Malaysia. In addition, although the market in India is slim and under-developed, it provide some
interesting evidences to show related arguments as presented in this paper.

4.1

Economic and social influences on the legitimacy and practice of casino gaming

Despite the social and ethical concerns (i.e., H) from the practice of casino gaming, a
fundamental incentive to the decision makers and the community to accept its legitimacy and
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growth over time may simply be referred to the significance of its economic contributions (i.e., T
and B). That is, the combined force as represented by τ and its influence on the structure,
organization and scale of the industry:   f 2 (T , B, H , u )  CG  f1 ( , , L, c,  ) .
To show the interplay of these forces, evolution of Macao’s casino industry may provide
a clear stock of evidences. As restricted by its very slim geographical area (only 11.6 km2 by
1912, and expanded by reclaiming land from sea to 29.9 km2 by the end of 2012), as well as the
lack of any natural resources and other sustainable business opportunities for its economic
growth and development, the business of gambling had long been accepted by the local
government and the community as an informal industry to support the city’s economic income.
Besides, owing to the fact that gambling is commonly regarded as a form of Chinese culture, the
harmful effects (H) was largely encapsulated by the majority’s acceptance of gambling.
Consequently, it is evident that the condition τ >  holds in Macao – when the former MacaoPortuguese Government formally legislated Macao as a “permanent gaming jurisdiction”
(Chapter 1, Article 4 in Decree Law 1496) and legalized casino gaming in 1962, little dispute
was received.
In addition, considering the administrative interests of the former Macao-Portuguese
Government in ensuring its tax income (T) and other political preferences (as entered into the
term u), monopoly structure and the related organization and scale of the Macao’s casino gaming
before the city’s sovereignty was resumed by the Chinese Government by the end of 1999, were
evidently influenced by the related laws and their interplay with the gaming firm (see Siu, 2006).
On the other hand, following the establishment of the Macao Special Administrative Region
(SAR), the changing public and community interests in the factors T, B and u respectively led to
the revisions of Macao’s gaming law (i.e., promulgation of Decree Law 16-2001). Accordingly,
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the industry’s structure, organization and scale (i.e., related factors as stated in function (1) are
modified) were altered, hence overall performance of the industry (i.e., CG) in this new
millennium also changed (comprehensive studies on related topics are also presented in Siu,
2006; Eadington and Siu, 2007).
In contrast to Macao, Singapore possesses a relatively appropriate industrial structure
(e.g., modern manufacturing, science and technology, banking and finance). Therefore, potential
economic benefits (T and B) which could be derived from approving casino gaming in Singapore
was far below the social and public concerns about the potential harmful effects. In addition, as
H was explicitly underlined by the government (i.e., H is reinforced among the community
through u), it was evident that τ <  in the case of Singapore before 2005 so that casino gaming
was prohibited. Nevertheless, in view of the declining existing manufacturing industries, and the
external threats/uncertainties faced by some major economic sectors (e.g., its high-tech and
financial sectors) since the last quarter of the 1990s, the Singapore Government’s attempt to push
the development of its tourism industry indeed led to the related decision makers’ re-assessment
of the net (social and economic) effects from approving casino gaming. Between the end of the
1990s and 2004, however, although several proposals were presented, they were banned.
Nevertheless, as the related forces was being accumulated over time, and a related support was
received by the country’s new Prime Minster from 2004, the casino bill was then finally
approved in 2005 when it was made clear that τ >  (see related justifications from the
government, e.g., Lim, 2005).
In Singapore, even casino gaming is approved, its structure, organization and scale are
different from Macao from a number of aspects. For example, regulation S 430/2009 for “casino
layout”, regulation S 663/2009 for “junkets”, and regulation S 507/2009 for “prevention of
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money laundering and terrorism financing”, etc. under the Casino Control Act (Chapter 33A),
define practice of this business in Singapore, which are very different from Macao, in terms of K,
 , c and M as specified in function (1) .

As compared to Macao and Singapore where they are categorized as “city-states”,
development of casino gaming in Malaysia and South Korea are restricted to only certain regions
within the nations, in which particular considerations of related benefits clearly out-weight the
potential harmful effects in related regions, hence lead to the governments’ approvals to the
development of casino gaming. In other words, nation-wide development of casino gaming may
not be approved if national instead of regional benefits and harmful effects are taken into
consideration.

For example, while the Malaysian Government’s approval for the Genting

Highland to include casino gaming in its property was indeed in line with the public interests to
push related infrastructure and tourism development in that region (see ICMR, 2004),
development of South Korea’s largest casino resort (i.e., the Kangwon Land), which accounts for
over 60% of the country’s GGR derived from casino gaming, in Gangwondo Province was
originally a public decision attempting to save and revitalize the declining local economy in that
province in the late 1990s (see e.g., Cho, 2002, 185).
Besides, owing to the differences in the attributes of local culture and legal system, the
practice of casino gaming in Malaysia and South Korea possess their own features. For example,
as a Muslim country, although casino gaming is legalized by the Malaysian Government
exclusively for Genting Highland, Muslims are prohibited to enter into that casino. In South
Korea, the impressive performance of Kangwon Land is largely accredited to the Government’s
approval which allows local residents to enter and play in that casino, while all other casinos in
the country are tagged as “foreigners’ casinos” and local residents are prohibited to visit. In any
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case, it is also clear that the structure, organization and scale of the industry are shaped by laws
in the first place, instead of a simple business decision.
While the above evidences show that the particular legal requirements which set forth for
the practice of casino gaming (i.e., the ultimate choice on an industry’s structure, its organization
and scale) are varied across jurisdictions according to the differences in their social and
administrative interests, a common factor which lead to the stage where τ >  is the explicit
economic benefits which are assessable in the decision making process.

4.2

Spillover effects of casino gaming

After the approval and development of casino gaming, an unarguable fact is that
participating firms and related workforce are not the only beneficiaries. As a 24/7 entertainment
business (which operates 24 hours a day and 7 days a week), a number of related and associated
sectors (e.g., local tourism, hotel, retailing, F&B, etc.) may indeed be able to develop
simultaneously with the dynamics which is generated from casino gaming. In other words, the
flow of income in the casino sector does spill over to other sectors in the economy, and vice
versa. On the other hand, owing to the nature of casino gaming that it may easily be overconsumed by some patrons, and be linked with various underground economic activities,
negative spillover effects may also be positively correlated with the growth of this industry.
Indeed, the rate of change of the related harmful effects with respect to the growth of casino
gaming is largely determined by the soundness of a jurisdiction’s legal system. That is,

and

2H
is indeterminate.
 2CG

H
0,
CG
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To reveal the spillover effects as stated in function (4) and Figure 1, evidences from the
above 4 jurisdictions could also be applied. Firstly, as the world’s largest casino jurisdiction
which is very monotonic in its economic and industrial base, the positive spillover effects have
long been recognized by the local community. Over a long period of time, significant amount of
gaming tax received by the public sector allows it to maintain a very low tax rate system as
imposed to the local community and business sectors. Following the rapid growth of the
industry’s GGR since the beginning of this new millennium, tax revenue received by the Macao
Government largely strengthens its financial power to spend on various social welfare and
education programs (see Siu, 2013a), and invest in the city’s infrastructure projects. In addition,
public subsidies are also made available to support the development of some related infant
industries (e.g., MICE and the cultural and creative industry) for the moderate diversification of
the local economy.
On top of the spillover effects which are diffused through the public spending,
development of casino gaming is also beneficial to the private sector directly and indirectly.
Traditionally, it is well-known that Macao’s tourism and hospitality/entertainment sectors were
heavily relied on (and even attached to) casino gaming. After the changing industrial structure
from monopoly to oligopoly in 2002 (related dynamics led to this change will be explored in the
next section), the spillover effects between casino gaming and the local tourism and
hospitality/entertainment sectors become more two-way. Indeed, the huge amount of capital
investment made by the casino firms in first ten years since the liberalization of the industry did
enlarge the fixed capacity for the development of Macao’s tourism, retailing and leisure, as well
as MICE.
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In any economic changes (including the process of industrial development), there must be
winners and losers. It the case of Macao’s casino development, it is evident that there are not
without any losers.

On top of the common harmful effects related to the problem and

pathological gambling which follow the rapid growth in the scale of casino gaming, adverse
impacts are also exerted to the traditional local business sectors (especially to the local small and
medium enterprises: SMEs). For example, it is evident that due to casinos’ competition for
related labor in the local market, continuous increase in labor cost has hurt the normal operations
and progress of many traditional local SMEs (related debates and complains are not difficult to
be retrieved from local newspapers).
To other Asian countries like Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea, as the economic
base of those economies are more diversified, positive spillover effects are more localized (or
regionalized), while harmful effects may more nationalized since after legalization and
development of casino gaming in a particular region of a country, the related gaming activities
are available to all citizens. By reverting to the cases of South Korea first, a review on the
Korean casino industry as performed by Lee (2010, 20-22) provides a very good stock of
evidences to illustrate the related spillover effects. For example, as quoted by Lee (2010),
“Kangwon Land generated $1.9 billion of direct and indirect effects, which is 77.5% for intraregion and 22.5% for other regions (Lee & Lee, 2010)”. Besides, on top of a much higher tax
revenue as received by the local government than its original expectation, tourism development
as stimulated by the practice of Kangwon Land is evident to the local community. Nevertheless,
it is also indicated that increasing WPUD (win per unit per day) as reported by this casino resort
(i.e., increasing CG) “is not free from accusation of increased gambling problem nationwide”
(Lee, 2010, 21). As a consequence, various parties post serious warning to Kwangon Land to
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take direct measures to check the harmful effects, or restrictive legal measures have to been
imposed to its business.
Although related empirical studies for Malaysia and Singapore are not available, similar
spillover effects as presented in South Korea may reasonably be suspected. For example, owing
to the primary intentions of these two countries to approve casino gaming in the respective
regions as a measure to support/push tourism development, related infrastructure projects as
invested by the casino firms and the public sectors, hence related business opportunities made
available to other related firms are evidently positive. On the other hand, it is observed that as a
Muslim country, the growth in the absolute scale of casino gaming in Malaysia is largely
restricted by law (which is indeed the government’s concern of the local religion and culture) on
the top, negative social issues like gambling problem and crimes which are being identified
directly related to the casino operations are not widely spread to the nation. In contrast, as
shortly after the opening of the two integrated resorts (IRs) in Singapore in 2010, and its reported
GGR has grown immediately larger than Las Vegas by 2011 to become the second largest casino
jurisdiction (following Macao) in the world (Siu, 2013b), it has also caught the attention of the
general public that social problems related to casino gaming may have widely spread to the
nation. In other words, the argument that

H
 0 could be verified with the aforementioned
CG

evidences.

4.3

The interplaying dynamics

Given the legal foundation for the development of casino gaming in any given period of
time, the actual performance of the industry and its spillover effects would then interact with one
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another, which then further determine the industry’s development path in the next period(s).
Throughout this process, it is commonly observed the negative spillover effects may perform as
a counter force to the various direct and indirect economic benefits, which would then either
restricts the industry’s attempt to expand, or holds it back from the existing scale, or approves its
further development. In other words, it is the interplaying process …  CGt  f4  f2  τ 
  f3  f1  CGt+1  … which determines the development path of casino gaming.

With reference to the historical evidences of Macao’s casino industry, it is obvious that
the public interests in economic benefits dominates the harmful effects to the local community,
hence supporting the government’s position to adopt simple regulatory measures, or loosely
enforce related laws to ensure the growth in the industry’s GGR over time. Nevertheless, as the
harmful effects being accumulated to a critical stage in which social stability was in threat
(especially serious organized crimes associated with the casino business), and administrative
interests altered when the former Macao-Portuguese Government was replaced by the Macao
Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government by the end of 1999, a new administrative
decision was made in 2002 to replace the industry’s long-practicing monopoly structure by an
oligopoly of 6 firms (see, e.g., Siu, 2006; Eadington and Siu, 2007).
Parallel to the liberalization decision, the Macao SAR Government also promulgated new
laws (Decree Law 16/2001, Regulation 6/2002, Decree Law 5/2004, etc.) to regulate the
activities of a special form of gaming agents (who could be deemed as the cause of the
uncontrolled social problem in the second half of the 1990s), as well as casino credit. Since all
of the newly promulgated laws are aiming to comfort the redevelopment and further expansion
of the industry under a more regulative framework, the scale of the industry grow dramatically
thereafter. Over a decade since Macao’s casino industry is being liberalized, it is evident that the
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interplay between the various factors as depicted in Figure 1 leads to the changing performance
of the industry (again the process …  CGt  f4  f2  τ    f3  f1  CGt+1  … could
be well-illustrated).
In contrast, India may provide an interesting case for an on and off development of casino
gaming industry as a consequence of the interplaying forces between various factors.
Traditionally, legitimacy of casino gaming has been a controversial topic to various public and
religious parties.

Over a long period of time, only some offshore small-scale casinos are

approved for tourism purpose. To further push the country’s tourism development, onshore
casinos were then approved in Goa. To advocate the public and community interests to check
the potential harmful effects, however, the Goa Anti-Gambling Act is still put into effect
simultaneously, which allows the protesting parties to prohibit local residents from entering into
the casinos, or to restrict the growth of the industry by enforcing extra licensing requirements to
the existing casinos. Besides, protesters also possess the legal rights to require some casinos to
close their business occasionally when related social problems are reported, or seen spread.
Consequently, performance and growth of the casino industry are evidently curbed (some related
evidences could be retrieved from casinocitytimes.com, 2008; Hand, 2011; Oberali, 2011;
Yogonet Group, 2011).

6. Conclusion and Remarks
Based on the paradigm being presented for the interplaying forces between law,
development and spillover effects of casino gaming, differences between the performance and
development path of this industry in various jurisdictions have been uncovered in this paper. It
is important to highlight that as a socially and ethically controversial industry, harmful effects
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(which include both economic and non-economic effects) may usually be stressed by the
protesting groups to ban or restrict the practice (e.g., scope and scale) of the related business,
which differentiates the practice of casino gaming from other industries. In other words, factors
taking into consideration by policy makers to regulate the casino industry is not solely economic,
but also include their social and political considerations (e.g., the society’s ceremonial views and
anxieties about the negative impacts from the activities related to gambling).
By referring to the evidences as derived from Macao, Singapore, Malaysia and South
Korea, as well as a snapshot in India, it is shown that the structure, organization and practice of a
casino industry is outlined by law in the first place. Then, the industry’s actual performance and
spillover effects would in turn alter the structure and enforcement of the laws in the succeeding
period. Indeed, these various components are interacting with one another dynamically, which
then lead to the changing performance of the industry as observed by the community in different
periods of time. Therefore, it is confirm again that while law is not exogenous to the economic
performance of an industry, the structure of the legal system in any given period of time is
neither necessarily be optimal to the related parities when they are doing their business in the
market. Instead, all the related parties are interplaying with each other in a dynamic physical
environment which jointly influence the process (the path) of the development of an industry.
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